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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court of Canada’s political process cases cover a wide array of
issues, including the right to vote, electoral redistricting, campaign ﬁnance and the
regulation of political parties.1 This article focuses on the Court’s most recent
section 3 decision, Frank v. Canada (Attorney General),2 as well as an upcoming
section 2(b) case, Toronto (City) v. Ontario (Attorney General).3 In Frank, the Court
held that provisions banning long-term non-resident citizens from voting in a federal
election infringed section 3 and were not justiﬁed under section 1 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.4 While the Frank decision is notable for its
powerful defence of the right to vote, it raises signiﬁcant implications for the
constitutionality of voter qualiﬁcations and election administration more generally.
Toronto (City) concerns Ontario’s mid-election change to Toronto’s electoral
districts. Not only is this case unprecedented and disquieting, it also gives rise to a
novel doctrinal puzzle: whether the mid-election restructuring of Toronto’s electoral
districts infringes the freedom of expression as protected by section 2(b) of the
Charter. I argue that a central question in the case is whether courts ought to take a
formal approach or a contextual approach to electoral expression, and its infringement, under section 2(b). While the formal approach is intuitive and logical, I claim
that the contextual approach, which leads to a ﬁnding of infringement in this case,
1
The main cases are: Reference re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Saskatchewan),
[1991] S.C.J. No. 46, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 158 (S.C.C.); Sauvé v. Canada (Attorney General),
[1993] S.C.J. No. 59, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 438 (S.C.C.); Haig v. Canada (Chief Electoral Offıcer),
[1993] S.C.J. No. 84, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 995 (S.C.C.); Harvey v. New Brunswick (Attorney
General), [1996] S.C.J. No. 82, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 876 (S.C.C.); Libman v. Quebec (Attorney
General), [1997] S.C.J. No. 85, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569 (S.C.C.); Thomson Newspapers Co. v.
Canada (Attorney General), [1998] S.C.J. No. 44, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877 (S.C.C.); Sauvé v.
Canada (Chief Electoral Offıcer), [2002] S.C.J. No. 66, 2002 SCC 68 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Sauvé II”]; Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] S.C.J. No. 37, 2003 SCC 37
(S.C.C.); Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 28, 2004 SCC 33 (S.C.C.);
R. v. Bryan, [2007] S.C.J. No. 12, 2007 SCC 12 (S.C.C.); Baier v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No.
31, 2007 SCC 31 (S.C.C.); Opitz v. Wrzesnewskyj, [2012] S.C.J. No. 55, 2012 SCC 55
(S.C.C.); B.C. Freedom of Information and Privacy Assn. v. British Columbia (Attorney
General), [2017] S.C.J. No. 6, 2017 SCC 6 (S.C.C.); Frank v. Canada (Attorney General),
[2019] S.C.J. No. 1, 2019 SCC 1 (S.C.C.).
2

[2019] S.C.J. No. 1, 2019 SCC 1 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Frank”].

3

[2018] O.J. No. 4596, 2018 ONSC 5151 (Ont. S.C.J.) [hereinafter “Toronto (City)
(ONSC)”]; Toronto (City) v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2019] O.J. No. 4741, 2019 ONCA
732 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Toronto (City) (ONCA)”]; Toronto (City) v. Ontario (Attorney
General), [2019] S.C.C.A. No. 414 (S.C.C.).
4
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
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is ultimately more consistent with the Supreme Court’s section 2(b) political process
decisions.
Although Frank and Toronto (City) are not doctrinally connected, a joint appraisal
of these two cases sheds light on the common underlying structure of the Court’s
doctrines under sections 3 and 2(b). As I have argued elsewhere, the Court’s election
law decisions identify multiple democratic rights5 and are attuned to the institutional
context within which these rights are exercised.6 A joint appraisal also provides an
opportunity to consider the relationship between section 3 and section 2(b). I claim
that, with respect to political process cases, section 3 and section 2(b) are best
understood as distinct yet complementary rights that are animated by the fundamental democratic values protected by the Charter.
This article is organized in three parts. Part II discusses Frank and considers some
of its implications for future challenges to voter qualiﬁcations. Part III discusses the
Court’s approach in its election law cases, and addresses the relationship between
section 3 and section 2(b). Part IV focuses on Toronto (City) and argues for a
contextual approach to electoral expression, and its infringement, under section
2(b). The conclusion summarizes the main themes.
II. FRANK V. CANADA (ATTORNEY GENERAL) AND

THE

RIGHT TO VOTE

The Canada Elections Act7 prohibited Canadians from voting in a federal election
after spending ﬁve years residing outside the country, subject to certain exceptions
such as membership in the public service or in international organizations.8 In a
decision by Penny J., the Ontario Superior Court held that the ﬁve-year non-resident
voting restriction infringed section 3 of the Charter, and was not justiﬁed under
section 1.9 The court found that any limitation, such as the non-resident voting
restriction, clearly constituted an infringement of the right to vote given the textual
language of section 3.10 None of the steps in the section 1 analysis were satisﬁed.11
In a 2-1 decision, the Ontario Court of Appeal reversed the Superior Court,
5

Yasmin Dawood, “Democracy and the Right to Vote: Rethinking Democratic Rights
under the Charter” (2013) 51 Osgoode Hall L.J. 251, at 254-55.
6

Yasmin Dawood, “Electoral Fairness and the Law of Democracy: A Structural Rights
Approach to Judicial Review” (2012) 62 U.T.L.J. 499, 503, 519-23.
7

S.C. 2000, c. 9.

8

Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9, ss. 11(d), 222. These provisions were amended
by Elections Modernization Act, S.C. 2018, c. 31, ss. 7, 152.
9

Frank v. Canada (Attorney General), [2014] O.J. No. 2098, 2014 ONSC 907, at paras.
98, 115, 130, 143, 153 (Ont. S.C.J.).
10
Frank v. Canada (Attorney General), [2014] O.J. No. 2098, 2014 ONSC 907, at paras.
79, 98 (Ont. S.C.J.).
11
Frank v. Canada (Attorney General), [2014] O.J. No. 2098, 2014 ONSC 907, at paras.
112-115, 126, 130, 136, 151 (Ont. S.C.J.).
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holding that while the non-resident voting restriction infringed section 3 it was
nonetheless justiﬁable under section 1.12 The majority opinion by Strathy C.J.O. and
Brown J.A. accepted the government’s contention that its goal of preserving “the
social contract” was a pressing and substantial objective.13 The social contract idea,
which was drawn from a passage in Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Offıcer),
referred to the connection between the “citizens’ obligation to obey the law and their
right to elect the lawmakers”.14 The majority found that rational connection,
minimal impairment and the ﬁnal balancing were all satisﬁed.15 In a dissenting
opinion, Laskin J.A. raised a number of concerns about the government’s social
contract objective and concluded that it did not satisfy any of the section 1
requirements.16
1.

Residence and the Right to Vote

In a 5-2 majority decision by Wagner C.J.C., the Supreme Court held that the
ﬁve-year non-resident voting restriction could not be justiﬁed under section 1.17
Although the Attorney General had conceded that the non-resident voting restriction
infringed section 3, the majority nevertheless addressed the right to vote and the role
of residence in order to provide the proper context for the justiﬁcation analysis.18
Because voting is a “fundamental political right”,19 explained the majority, section
3 warrants a broad and purposive interpretation of its terms particularly in view of
its exemption from the notwithstanding clause in section 33.20 The majority
emphasized that the Charter “tethers voting rights to citizenship, and citizenship
alone”.21 For this reason, and consistent with Sauvé II,22 the Court rejected internal
12

Frank v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] O.J. No. 3820, 2015 ONCA 436, at para.
160 (Ont. C.A.).
13

Frank v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] O.J. No. 3820, 2015 ONCA 436, at para.
93 (Ont. C.A.).
14
Frank v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] O.J. No. 3820, 2015 ONCA 436, at para.
95 (Ont. C.A.), citing Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Offıcer), [2002] S.C.J. No. 66, 2002
SCC 68, at para. 31 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Sauvé II”].
15
Frank v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] O.J. No. 3820, 2015 ONCA 436, at paras.
115-157 (Ont. C.A.).
16
Frank v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] O.J. No. 3820, 2015 ONCA 436, at paras.
165-167 (Ont. C.A.), per Laskin J.A., dissenting.
17

Frank, at para. 83. The majority opinion was joined by Moldaver, Karakatsanis, and
Gascon JJ. For an analysis of Frank, see Léonid Sirota, Doing Right on Rights, CanLII
Connects (February 9, 2019), online: <https://canliiconnects.org/en/commentaries/65435>.

18

Frank, at paras. 4, 24-35.

19

Frank, at para. 1.

20

Frank, at paras. 25, 27, 31.

21

Frank, at para. 29.
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limits, such as residence, on the right to vote.23 Section 3 makes no mention of
residence, noted the majority, and this omission by the framers of the Charter is
signiﬁcant.24 Residence is best treated as “an organizing mechanism for the
purposes of the right to vote”, rather than as an internal limit.25
Given the fundamental nature of the right to vote, any restrictions placed on
section 3 must therefore “be carefully scrutinized and cannot be tolerated without a
compelling justiﬁcation”.26 The Court drew a sharp line between limitations on the
right to vote, which require a stringent standard of justiﬁcation, and laws regulating
other aspects of the electoral process, such as campaign ﬁnance rules, which are
subject to judicial deference.27 The majority explained that the “natural attitude of
deference”, referenced in past decisions such Harper v. Canada (Attorney General)28
and R. v. Bryan,29 is appropriate for those cases that involve Parliament’s choices
with respect to “selecting and implementing Canada’s electoral model” but not for
the judicial review of “an absolute prohibition of a core democratic right”.30 The
Court’s position in Frank is consistent with its determination in Sauvé II that the
“right to vote is fundamental to our democracy and the rule of law and cannot be
lightly set aside. Limits on it require not deference, but careful examination.”31
In a concurring opinion, Rowe J. expressed concern that the majority opinion had
not recognized the importance of residence in Canada’s system of representation.32
For Rowe J., residence is not simply an organizing mechanism; instead, it is a
foundational part of the system.33 In addition, he emphasized that Frank should not
foreclose the constitutional permissibility of residence requirements in another
context.34 While residence is not an inherent limit on the right to vote, it could still
constitute a justiﬁable limit on section 3.35
22

Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Offıcer), [2002] S.C.J. No. 66, 2002 SCC 68, at para.
11 (S.C.C.).
23

Frank, at para. 31.

24

Frank, at para. 29.

25

Frank, at para. 28.

26

Frank, at para. 1.

27

Frank, at para. 43.

28

[2004] S.C.J. No. 28, 2004 SCC 33, at para. 87 (S.C.C.).

29

[2007] S.C.J. No. 12, 2007 SCC 12, at para. 9 (S.C.C.).

30

Frank, at paras. 43-44.

31

Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Offıcer), [2002] S.C.J. No. 66, 2002 SCC 68, at para.
9 (S.C.C.).
32

Frank, at para. 84, Rowe J., concurring.

33

Frank, at para. 90, Rowe J., concurring.

34

Frank, at para. 84, Rowe J., concurring.

35

Frank, at para. 90, Rowe J., concurring.
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2.

Revisiting Objectives in the Section 1 Analysis

Frank is also signiﬁcant for its discussion of the ﬁrst step of the section 1 Oakes
analysis, which requires a pressing and substantial objective. Although this step is
usually easily satisﬁed, the Frank majority concluded that the government’s social
contract objective was not pressing and substantial because it was “at once too
general, providing no meaningful ability to analyze the means employed to achieve
it, and too narrow, effectively collapsing any distinction between legislative means
and ends”.36 Because the social contract objective aims to prevent those who are not
subject to Canada’s laws from voting — which is also the effect of the means
employed by the government (exclusion of citizens who are insufficiently subjected
to the law) — the social contract objective was found to be no more than a
restatement of the legislation itself.37 In addition, the majority observed that the use
of social contract theory by the Court of Appeal to uphold the disenfranchisement
of long-term non-residents fundamentally misinterpreted the inclusive view of
voting rights in Sauvé II.38 Although the Court rejected the preservation of the social
contract as a viable objective, it held that the related objective of maintaining
electoral fairness was pressing and substantial.39
In a dissenting opinion, Côté and Brown JJ. argued for a new approach to section
1, urging that the analysis must acknowledge Parliament’s policy-making and
law-making capacity, including “deﬁning and defending the boundaries of rights”.40
Consistent with its constitutional vision, the dissent explained that the term “limit”
ought to be used instead of the term “infringement” when describing the government
measure at issue.41 Not only should Parliament have an active role in deﬁning the
boundaries of Charter rights, the dissent contended, but this role is particularly
relevant for the right to vote because it is a “positive entitlement” as compared to
most Charter rights, which are “negative in the sense that they preclude the state
from acting in ways that would impair them”.42 In particular, explained the dissent,
this approach implies that the legislature can pursue a range of objectives, some of
36

Frank, at para. 53. The Court cited the factum of the intervener David Asper Centre for
Constitutional Rights for the idea that the social contract objective and the means used to
bring it about were mutually deﬁned. Frank (Factum of the Interveners, David Asper Centre
for Constitutional Rights, University of Toronto Faculty of Law, at para. 13) [Disclosure: I
was a member of the team that worked on the Asper factum].
37

Frank, at para. 53.

38

Frank, at paras. 51-52.

39

Frank, at para. 54.

40

Frank, at para. 126, Côté and Brown JJ., dissenting, referencing Grégoire C.N. Webber,
The Negotiable Constitution: On the Limitation of Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2009), at 104.
41

Frank, at para. 121, Côté and Brown JJ., dissenting.

42

Frank, at para. 142, Côté and Brown JJ., dissenting [emphasis in original].
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which will be targeting a concrete problem while others will be pursuing “broader
philosophical goals”.43 The dissent argued that although Parliament’s social contract
objective is based on a particular philosophical vision of democracy, this alone does
not render it an illegitimate objective.44
3.

Section 3 and the Question of Deference

The Frank majority doubted that the Attorney General had satisﬁed rational
connection with respect to a residence limit of any duration.45 However, the
majority did not reach a ﬁnal conclusion on rational connection since it found that
the voting measure failed the minimal impairment stage. The time period of ﬁve
years had little justiﬁcation and was not carefully tailored to minimize the
impairment of voting rights.46 The limit was also overbroad in its application,
denying the vote to citizens who continued to have a deep connection to Canada and
who were often subject to its laws.47 In the ﬁnal balancing, the majority found that
the salutary effects of ensuring electoral fairness were “illusory” and clearly
outweighed by the deleterious effects of “disenfranchising well over one million
non-resident Canadians who are abroad for ﬁve years or more”.48 In addition, the
Court was not persuaded by the claim that the denial of the vote was temporary and
reversible, observing that in “no other context do we tolerate the idea that a person
can earn his or her Charter rights back through voluntary conduct”.49
Notably, the Frank majority rejected rationales based on voter worthiness. For the
Court, the denial of the right to vote not only undermines citizens’ fundamental
rights but it also “comes at the expense of their dignity and their sense of
self-worth”.50 Thus, the denial of the right to vote “in and of itself, inﬂicts harm on
affected citizens”.51 This harm is augmented when there is no evidence that the
denial solves a concrete problem. In the absence of such a problem, the denial is
inevitably about citizen worthiness, a rationale that the Court had rightly rejected in
past cases.52
The dissenting opinion by Côté and Brown JJ. objected to the majority’s
43

Frank, at para. 139, Côté and Brown JJ., dissenting.

44

Frank, at para. 140, Côté and Brown JJ., dissenting.

45

Frank, at para. 60.

46

Frank, at para. 67.

47

Frank, at paras. 68-72.

48

Frank, at paras. 77-78.

49

Frank, at para. 81.

50

Frank, at para. 82.

51

Frank, at para. 82 [emphasis in original].

52

Frank, at para. 82.
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“unjustiﬁably absolutist” interpretation of section 3.53 Instead, the dissent urged an
approach that has two key features. First, the dissent argued that Parliament was not
attempting to solve a problem but rather was “quite properly striving to shape the
boundaries of the right”.54 In view of Parliament’s rights-shaping role, the dissent
was deferential in the section 1 analysis, ﬁnding that Parliament’s objective of
preserving a relationship of currency between electors and the elected was pressing
and substantial.55 Rational connection and minimal impairment were met.56 As for
the ﬁnal balancing, the salutary effects of preserving Parliament’s conception of the
right to vote outweighed the deleterious effect of the reversible disenfranchisement
of long-term non-residents.57
Second, Côté and Brown JJ. placed considerable weight on the historical
signiﬁcance of Canada’s geographically based electoral system as enshrined in the
Constitution Act, 1867.58 Rather than an adopting an originalist account of section
3, the dissent suggested that historical commitments about the regional structure of
the electoral system are relevant to deciding whether a particular limit to section 3
is justiﬁable under section 1.59 For the dissent, limits to voting rights should be
deferentially treated in light of such historical commitments — a sharp contrast to
the textualism, and vision of progressive enfranchisement, espoused by the Frank
majority.
4.

Voter Qualiﬁcations and Election Administration

The Frank decision has implications for voter qualiﬁcations, most notably, the
minimum age requirement. As Colin Feasby argues, considerable support can be
mustered for the view that the voting age could be lowered to 16 in the wake of
Frank.60 Future challenges could also be brought against other administrative
53

Frank, at para. 148, Côté and Brown JJ., dissenting.

54

Frank, at para. 140, Côté and Brown JJ., dissenting.

55

Frank, at paras. 139, 151-158, Côté and Brown JJ., dissenting.

56

Frank, at paras. 150-151, 160-164, Côté and Brown JJ., dissenting.

57

Frank, at paras. 168-172, Côté and Brown JJ., dissenting.

58

Frank, at paras. 154-157, 169, Côté and Brown JJ., dissenting; Constitution Act, 1867
(U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3.
59
Frank, at para. 155, Côté and Brown JJ., dissenting. For an argument about the Court’s
use of history and originalism, see J. Gareth Morley, “Dead Hands, Living Trees, Historic
Compromises: The Senate Reform and Supreme Court Act References Bring the Originalism
Debate to Canada” (2016) 53 Osgoode Hall L.J. 745, at 746-50. For an analysis of the
dissent’s approach to section 1, see Prof. J. Weinrib, The Frank Dissent’s Novel Theory of
the Charter: The Rhetoric and the Reality, in this volume.
60

Colin Feasby, “Taking Youth Seriously: Reconsidering the Constitutionality of the
Voting Age” ABlawg (June 11, 2019), online: <http://ablawg.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/
06/Blog_CF_Frank.pdf>.
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measures, such as voter identiﬁcation requirements,61 the location of polling places,
the number of days of early voting, and so forth. Given the need for effective
electoral administration, however, some limitations on the right to vote are to be
expected.62 The Frank majority was careful to insist that its rejection of internal
limits did not mean that every restriction on the right to vote would necessarily be
unconstitutional.63 Limits must be justiﬁed under section 1 rather than being
incorporated into the scope of the right itself.64 Given the rigour of the Court’s
approach to section 1 with respect to voting restrictions, however, the available
social science evidence may be insufficient.65 The Frank majority acknowledged
these evidentiary difficulties, stating that in such cases the government can rely on
“inferential reasoning that is premised on logic and common sense”.66 While the
Frank majority did not place much weight on the comparative experience of other
democracies with respect to non-resident voting,67 a comparative view could be
useful in the absence of reliable social science evidence.
III. DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS UNDER SECTION 3 AND SECTION 2(b)
Frank provides an opportunity to consider the Supreme Court’s political process
jurisprudence as a whole.68 The Court has played an important role in supervising
democratic processes, rights and values. According to the Court, the principle of
democracy is a “fundamental value in our constitutional law and political culture”.69
Many of its decisions have signiﬁcant implications for democratic rights and the
61
Lower courts have upheld voter identiﬁcation requirements as a justiﬁed infringement
of section 3. See Henry v. Canada (Attorney General), [2010] B.C.J. No. 798, 2010 BCSC
610 (B.C.S.C.); Henry v. Canada (Attorney General), [2014] B.C.J. No. 122, 2014 BCCA 30
(B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2014] S.C.C.A. No. 134 (S.C.C.). For a discussion of
voter identiﬁcation requirements in Canada, see Maxime St-Hilaire & Léonid Sirota,
“Canadian Voter Identiﬁcation Requirements in a Comparative Perspective” (2015) J.P.P.L.
1.
62
Although Opitz v. Wrzesnewskyj, [2012] S.C.J. No. 55, 2012 SCC 55 (S.C.C.) did not
address the constitutionality of voter eligibility procedures, the Court was mindful of the need
for various requirements to administer an election (at para. 38).
63

Frank, at para. 31.

64

Frank, at para. 31.

65

Yasmin Dawood, “Democracy and Deference: The Role of Social Science Evidence in
Election Law Cases” (2013-2014) 32 N.J.C.L. 173, at 176-80.
66

Frank, at para. 64.

67

Frank, at para. 62.

68

For an overview and analysis, see Yasmin Dawood, “Democratic Rights” in Peter
Oliver, Patrick Macklem & Nathalie Des Rosiers, eds., The Oxford Handbook of the
Canadian Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).
69

Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.J. No. 61, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at para.
61 (S.C.C.).
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functioning of the electoral process. This set of political process cases can be
described alternatively as the Court’s election law decisions or as the law of
democracy.70 These cases have been decided under section 3,71 section 2(b),72
section 2(d)73 and section 15.74 Some cases address more than one Charter right.75
In these cases, the Court has developed complex and nuanced theories about
democracy and the right to vote. As I have argued elsewhere, there are two
important features of the Court’s approach.76 First, the Court has recognized
multiple democratic rights;77 second, it has paid attention to the individual and
70

Colin Feasby, “Constitutional Questions About Canada’s New Political Finance
Regime” (2007) 43 Osgoode Hall L.J. 514, at 539 (deﬁning the law of the political process
as encompassing decisions that fall under ss. 2, 3 and 15).
71

The main section 3 cases are: Reference re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Saskatchewan),
[1991] S.C.J. No. 46, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 158 (S.C.C.), Sauvé v. Canada (Attorney General),
[1993] S.C.J. No. 59, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 438 (S.C.C.), Haig v. Canada (Chief Electoral Offıcer),
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institutional aspects of these rights.78 In so doing, the Court has developed a set of
sophisticated jurisprudential tools to supervise various aspects of democratic
governance — not only the structures, institutions and processes of democracy, but
also its values, ideals and principles. As a result of its nuanced treatment of
democratic rights, the Court has considerable ﬂexibility in responding to a wide
range of issues — such as electoral redistricting, campaign ﬁnance regulation, voter
qualiﬁcations and the regulation of political parties.79
1.

Democratic Rights Under Section 3

The ﬁrst feature of the Court’s approach, I claim, is that the Court has interpreted
the right to vote as a plural right. That is, the Court has adopted what I refer to as
a “bundle of rights” approach, which recognizes multiple democratic rights, each of
which is concerned with a particular facet of democratic participation and
governance.80 Following a purposive approach, the Court has recognized that
section 3 protects, in addition to the activities of voting and running for office, the
following democratic rights: (1) the right to effective representation; (2) the right to
meaningful participation; and (3) the right to an informed vote.81
Not only are these democratic rights indispensable to the Court’s review of the
democratic process, but the violation of any right constitutes a breach of section 3.
The Court has also identiﬁed a fourth democratic right, noting that section 3
“imposes on Parliament an obligation not to interfere with the right of each citizen
to participate in a fair election”.82 Although the right to participate in a fair election
is underdeveloped, I have argued elsewhere that it offers a promising way for the
78
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Handbook of the Canadian Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017), at
724-25.
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Court to ensure the fairness and legitimacy of the electoral process.83 For instance,
it would enable the Court to counter the undue inﬂuence of partisanship on the
formation of electoral laws.84
The second feature of the Court’s approach is that it has been highly attuned to
the dual individual-institutional nature of democratic rights. Rights do not exist in
a vacuum but are instead exercised within a particular political, institutional and
societal context. For example, the right to vote presupposes the existence of an
entire infrastructure of institutions and actors, including candidates, electoral
districts, elections, political parties and legislatures. Democratic rights are held by
individuals, yet the exercise of these rights takes place within a particular
institutional context. I use the term “structural rights” to capture the complex nature
of democratic rights.85 The participation of individuals is the key focus (hence the
emphasis on rights), but individuals exercise these rights within an institutional
context (hence the emphasis on structure).86
Although the Court does not employ the language of “structural rights”, its
decisions are notable for their attention to the complex nature of democratic rights.
The democratic rights described above — the right to effective representation, the
right to meaningful participation and the right to an informed vote — have both an
individual and an institutional dimension. Although the Court has described these
rights as being held by individuals, it is attuned to the broader institutional
framework within which these democratic rights are deﬁned, held and exercised.87
To illustrate both features of the Court’s approach, consider the right to play a
meaningful role in the democratic process.88 This right was ﬁrst recognized by the
Court in Haig v. Canada (Chief Electoral Offıcer)89 and subsequently developed in
Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General).90 In Figueroa, the Court found that the
purpose of section 3 “includes not only the right of each citizen to have and to vote
83
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for an elected representative in Parliament or a legislative assembly, but also the
right of each citizen to play a meaningful role in the electoral process”.91 In a
democracy, each citizen “must have a genuine opportunity to take part in in the
governance of the country through participation in the selection of elected
representatives”.92 In Figueroa, the Court held that a registration rule that denied
beneﬁts to smaller political parties infringed section 3 and was not justiﬁable under
section 1.93 Although this registration rule did not prevent citizens from casting a
ballot, it diminished the ability of citizens to participate fully in the democratic
process. As noted by the Court, political parties act “as both a vehicle and outlet” for
the participation of citizens in the electoral process.94 Thus, the rules governing
political parties have a direct impact on the ability of citizens to play a meaningful
role in the democratic process.95 The right to meaningful participation, while held
by individuals, has an institutional dimension because an individual’s ability to
participate meaningfully is affected by the broader institutional framework within
which her participation is taking place.
2.

Democratic Rights Under Section 2(b)

As the Supreme Court has observed, “voting is a form of expression”96 and
section 2(b) pertains to the “expressive aspects of voting”.97 Campaigning is another
activity that receives section 2(b) protection. Election advertising is situated at the
“core” of free expression, “war-rant[ing] a high degree of constitutional protection”.98 The Court has affirmed that the connection “between freedom of expression
and the political process is perhaps the linchpin of the s. 2(b) guarantee”.99
also acknowledged in Frank v. Canada (Attorney General), [2019] S.C.J. No. 1, 2019 SCC
1, at para. 26 (S.C.C.).
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I argue that, similar to its approach under section 3, the Court has interpreted
section 2(b) to protect more than a person’s right to cast a ballot or engage in
campaigning. I claim that the Court has identiﬁed two democratic rights — the right
to equal participation and the right to a free and informed vote — that apply to
electoral expression under section 2(b). These two rights were ﬁrst recognized in
Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General)100 and subsequently endorsed in Harper v.
Canada (Attorney General).101
The right of equal participation was ﬁrst recognized by the Court in Libman.102
The Court explained that to “ensure a right of equal participation in democratic
government, laws limiting spending are needed to preserve the equality of
democratic rights and ensure that one person’s exercise of the freedom to spend does
not hinder the communication opportunities of others”.103 The Court held that
restrictions on independent spending in the context of a referendum infringed
section 2(b) and were not justiﬁed under section 1.104 Although the Court struck
down the restrictions, it appeared to favour, as noted by Colin Feasby, an
“egalitarian” approach to the rules governing spending during a referendum or an
election.105 Due to the “competitive nature of elections, such spending limits are
necessary to prevent the most affluent from monopolizing election discourse and
consequently depriving their opponents of a reasonable opportunity to speak and be
heard”.106 In Harper, Bastarache J. labelled Libman’s ﬁrst principle, “the right of
equal participation in democratic government”, as being concerned with an “equal
dissemination of points of view”.107
100
Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1997] S.C.J. No. 85, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569, at
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101

Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 28, 2004 SCC 33, at para. 61
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The right to a free and informed vote was also ﬁrst identiﬁed in Libman.108 The
Court recognized “the right of electors to be adequately informed of all the political
positions advanced by the candidates and by the various political parties”.109 In
Harper, the Court labelled this right in Libman as a “free and informed vote”.110
Although the right to a free and informed vote falls within the scope of section 2(b),
I claim that, in Harper, the Court recognized that the right to a free and informed
vote also protects an interest under section 3. The Court explained that the “right to
meaningful participation includes a citizen’s right to exercise his or her vote in an
informed manner”.111 Voters must “be able to weigh the relative strengths and
weaknesses of each candidate and political party”.112 In addition, the citizen “must
also be able to consider opposing aspects of issues associated with certain
candidates and political parties where they exist”.113 Drawing from Libman, the
Court declared that “the voter has a right to be ‘reasonably informed of all the
possible choices’”.114 To be an informed voter, voters must “be able to hear all
points of view”, which means that the “information disseminated by third parties,
candidates and political parties cannot be unlimited” because the political discourse
could otherwise be dominated by the affluent or by groups who can “ﬂood the
electoral discourse with their message”.115 This unequal dissemination of viewpoints undermines the “voter’s ability to be adequately informed of all views”.116
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Since the right to a free and informed vote was discussed interchangeably by the
Court as protecting an interest under both section 2(b) and section 3, I argue that this
right is the one area of doctrinal overlap between sections 2(b) and 3. In addition,
and similar to the rights under section 3, the right of equal participation and the right
to a free and informed vote are intelligible only with reference to the larger
institutional, political, and social context within which these rights are exercised.
In my view, the Court’s discussion of these two rights suggests that they are not
intended for exclusive use by the government to justify campaign ﬁnance limits.
Instead, I argue that these principles can be used by the Court as a general matter
to assess the constitutional sufficiency of legislation that has an impact on electoral
expression. In Harper, the Court noted that in Libman it had “endorsed several
principles applicable to the regulation of election spending”,117 including the right
of equal participation and the right to a free and informed vote. The Court also
observed that its own conception of electoral fairness, as reﬂected in the Libman
principles, was “consistent with the egalitarian model of elections adopted by
Parliament as an essential component of our democratic society”.118 This wording
suggests that the Court has established an independent set of principles and rights —
one which is consistent with Parliament’s egalitarian model. Certainly, these two
rights can be used as the basis for the government’s legislative objectives. Indeed,
in R. v. Bryan, the government identiﬁed “informational equality among voters” as
a pressing and substantial objective.119 Informational equality can be viewed as the
government-objective corollary of the right to a free and informed vote.
3.

The Relationship Between Section 3 and Section 2(b)

Although sections 3 and 2(b) can both apply to the same set of facts, they are not
interchangeable provisions. In my view, section 3 and section 2(b) are best
understood as distinct yet complementary rights that are animated by the fundamental democratic values protected by the Charter. In Thomson Newspapers Co. v.
Canada (Attorney General), the Court explained that one signiﬁcant distinction
between these rights is that section 2(b) is subject to the override in section 33 of the
Charter, but section 3 is not.120 The Court rejected a hierarchical approach to rights,
and instead observed that “Charter principles require a balance to be achieved that
fully respects the importance of both sets of rights”.121
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In the event of an overlap between the right to free expression and the right to
vote, “[e]ach right is distinct and must be given effect”.122 In Baier v. Alberta, the
Court clariﬁed that the scope of one Charter right does not narrow the scope of
another.123 Section 3, the Court explained, “does not ‘occupy the ﬁeld’ just because
the right claimed . . . involves standing for an election”.124 When both the right to
vote and free expression are at issue “each right must be given effect”.125 This
means that “ﬁnding that s. 3 does not apply does not foreclose consideration of a
claim under s. 2(b)”.126 In the event of a conﬂict between the right to vote and
freedom of expression, it is necessary to “ﬁnd an appropriate balance between both
sets of rights”.127
Although section 3 and section 2(b) are distinct rights, I argue that both provisions
share the common ground of fundamental democratic values. According to the
Court, the Charter “protects a complex of interacting values, each more or less
fundamental to the free and democratic society that is Canada”.128 The content of
each right “imbues and informs our understanding of the value structure sought to
be protected by the Charter as a whole”.129 As noted by the Court, “a value-oriented
approach to the broadly worded guarantees of the Charter has been repeatedly
endorsed by Charter jurisprudence over the last quarter century”.130 For these
reasons, I claim that sections 3 and 2(b) are distinct rights with their own meaning
and precedents, but are also complementary rights because they are animated by and
jointly reinforce the fundamental democratic values protected by the Charter.131
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IV. TORONTO (CITY) V. ONTARIO (ATTORNEY GENERAL) AND
EXPRESSION

THE

FREEDOM

OF

The Supreme Court’s section 2(b) political process jurisprudence is relevant to the
upcoming Toronto (City) case. The facts of this case are unprecedented. In 2018, the
Province of Ontario enacted Bill 5, known as the Better Local Government Act,
2018, which reduced the number of electoral wards in the City of Toronto from 47
to 25.132 When Bill 5 came into force on August 14, 2018, Toronto’s municipal
election had already been underway since May 1, 2018 under the 47-ward structure,
with 509 candidates running for municipal office.133 Election day was set for
October 22, 2018. The Ontario Superior Court held that Bill 5 was unconstitutional
on the basis that it unjustiﬁably infringed section 2(b).134 Within a few days, the
Ontario Court of Appeal granted a stay on the Superior Court’s order, allowing the
election to proceed along the new 25-ward structure.135 The following year, in a 3-2
judgment on the merits, the Ontario Court of Appeal reversed the Superior Court on
the basis that Bill 5 had not infringed section 2(b).136 The Supreme Court granted
leave to appeal in March 2020.137
Toronto (City) raises a novel doctrinal issue: did the mid-election restructuring of
Toronto’s electoral districts infringe the freedom of expression as protected by
section 2(b) of the Charter? In what follows, I claim that a central question in the
case is whether courts ought to take a formal approach or a contextual approach to
electoral expression, and its infringement, under section 2(b). A formal approach
treats the expressive activity in isolation, without reference to the wider circumstances in which the expressive activity takes place. Under a formal approach, it is
irrelevant that the expression in question is that of registered candidates campaigning in an election for public office during the official election period.
A contextual approach, by contrast, treats the expressive activity as being
embedded within a particular institutional, political and social context. Under a
contextual approach, the fact that the expression is electoral is central to the
analysis. The use of the term “contextual” here is conceptually consistent with the
contextual approach to section 1 analysis. As Wilson J. explained in Edmonton
electoral expression, see Yasmin Dawood, “Democracy and the Freedom of Speech:
Rethinking the Conﬂict Between Liberty and Equality” (2013) 26 Can J.L. & Jur. 293.
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Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), “[o]ne virtue of the contextual approach . . .
is that it recognizes that a particular right or freedom may have a different value
depending on the context”.138 The contextual approach is relevant both with respect
to the determination of the meaning and scope of the right, and with respect to
section 1 balancing.139 In practice, however, the contextual approach has been
predominantly used in the section 1 balancing,140 subject to some limited exceptions.141
To explore these ideas, this Part is organized in the following sections. Part IV.1
brieﬂy discusses the lower court judgments. Part IV.2 elaborates the Irwin Toy142
framework and applies it to Bill 5. The main issue is whether Bill 5, in its effects,
infringes section 2(b). Part IV.3 sets out three distinct approaches under the
contextual account, all of which lead to a ﬁnding that section 2(b) is infringed. First,
Bill 5 infringes the candidates’ electoral expression. Second, Bill 5 also infringes the
two principles —- the candidates’ right to equal participation and the voters’ right
to a free and informed vote —- which are protected by section 2(b). Third, under a
broader contextual account, Bill 5 also infringes section 2(b)’s protection of the
deliberative exchange among all electoral participants, an approach exempliﬁed by
MacPherson J.A.’s dissenting judgment at the Court of Appeal. Part IV.4 focuses on
the Baier framework and positive rights. Part IV.5 compares the formal and
138

[1989] S.C.J. No. 124, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326, at 1355 (S.C.C.), Wilson J., concurring.
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As Wilson J. put it, “a right or freedom may have different meanings in different
contexts”, and as a result, the “value to be attached to in different contexts for the purpose of
the balancing under s. 1 might also be different.” Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney
General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 124, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326, at 1365 (S.C.C.), Wilson J.,
concurring. In a later case, Cory J. explained that “[c]ontext is relevant both with respect to
the delineation of the meaning and scope of Charter rights, as well as the determination of
the balance to be struck between individual rights and the interests of society.” R. v.
Wholesale Travel Group Inc., [1991] S.C.J. No. 79, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 154, at 226 (S.C.C.),
Cory J., dissenting in part.
140

The contextual approach has been used extensively in the s. 1 analysis in freedom of
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Roach & David Schneiderman, “Freedom of Expression in Canada” (2013) 61 S.C.L.R. (2d)
429, at 439. For a critique of the Court’s contextual approach in s. 2(b) cases, see Jamie
Cameron, “A Reﬂection on Section 2(b)’s Quixotic Journey, 1982-2012” (2012) 58 S.C.L.R.
(2d) 163, at 171; Jamie Cameron, “Justice in Her Own Right: Bertha Wilson and the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (2008) 41 S.C.L.R. (2d) 371, at 401-402.
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For example, the contextual approach has been used to determine the scope of rights
in s. 7 and s. 8 cases: R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc., [1991] S.C.J. No. 79, [1991] 3 S.C.R.
154, at 238 (S.C.C.), Cory J., dissenting in part; R. v. White, [1999] S.C.J. No. 28, [1999] 2
S.C.R. 417, at paras. 45-48 (S.C.C.); R. v. Fitzpatrick, [1995] S.C.J. No. 94, [1995] 4 S.C.R.
154, at paras. 49-52 (S.C.C.).
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Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R.
927 (S.C.C.).
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contextual approaches, and concludes that the contextual approach is ultimately
more persuasive.
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1.

Decisions of the Superior Court and the Court of Appeal

At the Ontario Superior Court, Belobaba J. found that Bill 5 unjustiﬁably
infringed section 2(b) in two respects.143 First, the candidate’s freedom of
expression was breached by the enactment of the new ward structure while the
election campaign was already underway.144 Relying on the Irwin Toy framework,
Belobaba J. held that Bill 5’s mid-election change to the electoral districts
“substantially interfered with the candidate’s ability to effectively communicate his
or her political message to the relevant voters”.145 Second, the voter’s free
expression “right to cast a vote that can result in effective representation” was
breached by Bill 5’s effect of nearly doubling the population size of the wards.146
In a majority judgment by Miller J.A., the Court of Appeal held that Belobaba J.
incorrectly expanded the scope of section 2(b) from a protection against government
interference with expression to a guarantee that “government action would not
impact the effectiveness of that expression in achieving its intended purpose”.147
That is, section 2(b) protects individuals from government interference with the
expressive activity itself, not the intended result of the activity.148 Thus, legislation
that changes the ward structure, “such that a person’s past communications lose their
relevance and no longer contribute to the desired project (election to public office)”
does not amount to an infringement of section 2(b).149 As for the second
infringement, Miller J.A. held that it was based on an interpretation of free
expression that impermissibly imported the value of effective representation from
section 3 into the scope of section 2(b).150
In addition, Miller J.A. held that the candidates were actually making a positive
rights claim to a platform for expression, and therefore Baier, rather than Irwin Toy,
applied.151 According to Miller J.A., the ﬁrst two steps of the test in Baier were
met.152 This establishes that the claim is a positive rights claim, at which point, at
143

Toronto (City) (ONSC), at paras. 10, 20.
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Toronto (City) (ONSC), at para. 20.
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Toronto (City) (ONSC), at para. 32.
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Toronto (City) (ONSC), at para. 20.
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Toronto (City) (ONCA), at para. 39.

148

Toronto (City) (ONCA), at para. 41.
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Toronto (City) (ONCA), at para. 41.
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Toronto (City) (ONCA), at para. 71. I agree with this assessment.
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Toronto (City) (ONCA), at para. 48.
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The majority found that the ﬁrst step of Baier was met: a form of expression (electoral
campaigning) was at issue. At the second step, the majority determined that the claimants
were making a positive rights claim to a particular platform, rather than a claim to be free
from government interference. Toronto (City) (ONCA), at paras. 51, 55, applying Baier v.
Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 31, 2007 SCC 31, at para. 30 (S.C.C.).
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the third step of Baier, the three factors set forth in Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney
General) must be satisﬁed.153 Because none of the three Dunmore factors could be
satisﬁed in this case, Miller J.A. held that the claimants’ section 2(b) claim had
failed.154
In a dissenting opinion, MacPherson J.A. held that Bill 5 infringed section 2(b)
because it “substantially interfered with the right of all electoral participants to
freely express themselves within the terms of the election after it had begun”.155 The
mid-election timing of Bill 5 “changed the entire landscape” of an election that was
almost two-thirds of the way through the election period.156 As such, it amounted
to a “substantial attack on the centrepiece of democracy” in an active election in one
of the three levels of government.157
2.

The Irwin Toy Framework

To determine whether expressive activity is protected by section 2(b), there are
three inquiries under the Irwin Toy framework. First, does the activity in question
have expressive content, thereby bringing it within the scope of section 2(b)
protection? Second, is the activity excluded from that protection as a result of either
the method or location of expression? Third, if the activity is protected by section
2(b), does an infringement of the protected right result from either the purpose or the
effect of the government action?158 The ﬁrst two steps are met: the activity in
question — electoral expression — falls within the scope of section 2(b) and there
is nothing about its method or location that would warrant exclusion. As for the third
step, the main question is whether Bill 5, in purpose or effect, infringed the freedom
of expression.
The purpose of Bill 5 does not infringe free expression. In order to effectuate the
153

Toronto (City) (ONCA),, at para. 56, citing Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General),
[2001] S.C.J. No. 87, 2001 SCC 94, at paras. 24-26 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dunmore”].
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Under the ﬁrst Dunmore factor, the majority reasoned that the candidates’ claim was
not grounded in the freedom of expression because it was ultimately concerned with the
efficacy of expression, which is not protected by s. 2(b). While the claim failed here, Miller
J.A. nonetheless analyzed the two remaining factors. Under the second factor, the majority
concluded that there was no substantial interference because the ward change did not prevent
the candidates from engaging in expression. As for the third factor, the majority stated that
this factor must also fail because the claimants had not been barred from engaging in free
expression. Toronto (City) (ONCA), at paras. 60-61, 63, 68.
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Toronto (City) (ONCA), at para. 128, MacPherson J.A., dissenting.
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Toronto (City) (ONCA), at para. 114, MacPherson J.A., dissenting.
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Toronto (City) (ONCA), at para. 116, MacPherson J.A., dissenting.
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Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R.
927, at 967-977 (S.C.C.); Montréal (City) v. 2952-1366 Québec Inc., [2005] S.C.J. No. 63,
2005 SCC 62, at para. 56 (S.C.C.); Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Canada (Attorney
General), [2011] S.C.J. No. 2, 2011 SCC 2, at para. 38 (S.C.C.).
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change to the ward system, however, Ontario enacted regulations in addition to Bill
5. One of these regulations, Ontario Regulation 407/18,159 which came into effect on
August 15, 2018, established special rules for the 2018 and 2022 elections by
replacing various provisions of the Municipal Elections Act, 1996.160 Reg 407/18
provides a number of new campaign ﬁnance rules, including directing the city clerk
to calculate new maximum expense limits for candidates,161 establishing a new
formula for determining the number of electors,162 requiring the use of this new
formula to calculate the expense limits for candidates and third parties,163 and
directing the city clerk to notify candidates about their maximum expense limits.164
It is plausible to argue that the campaign ﬁnance provisions in Reg 407/18 satisfy
the purpose prong of the Irwin Toy framework. A possible objection, however, is that
Reg 407/18 did not engage in a “restriction” of speech because the new campaign
ﬁnance limits were doubled due to the larger ward sizes imposed by Bill 5. Yet Irwin
Toy does not draw this distinction: it simply asks “whether the purpose or effect of
the impugned governmental action was to control attempts to convey meaning
through that activity”.165 Irwin Toy is not concerned with whether the government
has engaged in greater or lesser regulation of expression as compared to some earlier
state of affairs; the only issue is whether the government has aimed to control
expression. The Irwin Toy infringement standard is easy to meet; courts seem to
accept any degree of limitation as a restriction of section 2(b). That being said, even
if the purpose of Reg 407/18 is to control expression, it would likely be treated
separately from Bill 5.
For this reason, the effects prong of Irwin Toy must be considered. As described
above, the second step of Irwin Toy asks whether the impugned law, in purpose or
effect, restricts the freedom of expression. For the effects prong, a claimant must
additionally show that her activity promotes at least one of values underlying free
expression, namely, the pursuit of truth, democratic participation or individual
self-fulﬁllment.166 This additional requirement is met since electoral expression
clearly advances the underlying values of section 2(b).
The remaining question is whether the effects of Bill 5 restrict expression. Both
159

2018 and 2022 Regular Elections – Special Rules, O. Reg. 407/18 [hereinafter “Reg
407/18”].
160

S.O. 1996, c. 32, Sch.
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2018 and 2022 Regular Elections – Special Rules, O. Reg. 407/18, ss. 10(2), 10(3).
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2018 and 2022 Regular Elections – Special Rules, O. Reg. 407/18, s. 11(2).
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Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R.
927, at 972 (S.C.C.) [emphasis added].
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Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1989] S.C.J. No. 36, [1989] 1 S.C.R.
927, at 976 (S.C.C.).
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Belobaba J. at the Superior Court and MacPherson J.A. dissenting at the Court of
Appeal found that Bill 5 “substantially interfered” with free expression.167 The
“substantial interference” standard of infringement is used in section 2(d) cases. It
is also used under the positive rights section 2(b) Baier/Dunmore test because
Dunmore is a section 2(d) case. The “substantial interference” test is considered to
be far more demanding than the infringement standard under section 2(b).168 No
doubt this tougher standard was used by Belobaba J. and MacPherson J.A. because
if the section 2(b) infringement standard is satisﬁed under the positive rights Baier
framework, then it would certainly be met under the Irwin Toy framework. For
clarity, though, “substantial interference” is not the standard under Irwin Toy for
demonstrating infringement when the effects of government action are at issue.169
To demonstrate an infringement, Irwin Toy asks “whether the purpose or effect of
the government action in question was to restrict freedom of expression”, which the
Court alternatively describes as an inquiry into whether “the purpose or effect of the
impugned governmental action was to control attempts to convey meaning through
that activity”.170
3.

The Contextual Approach to Electoral Expression

To shed further light on the question of whether Bill 5, in its effects, infringed
section 2(b), it is helpful to consider, ﬁrst, the nature of electoral expression, and,
second, the impact of Bill 5 and its accompanying regulations on electoral
expression.
(a)

Electoral Expression as Legally Mediated Speech

Campaign speech plays a central role in the election process. It is comprised of
two kinds of speech: regulated and unregulated. Unregulated campaign speech is
akin to ordinary expression: it takes place when candidates have conversations with
voters, engage in debates with political opponents or give interviews to the media.
Regulated speech — which I will refer to as “electoral expression” — is subject to
a set of complex and stringent rules in order to ensure the fairness of an election. In
the electoral context, money is effectively the equivalent of speech. To ensure
electoral fairness, campaign ﬁnance rules place strict limits on the amount of money
167

Toronto (City) (ONSC), at paras. 10, 32, 38; Toronto (City) (ONCA), at para. 128,
MacPherson J.A., dissenting.
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Rosiers, eds., The Oxford Handbook of the Canadian Constitution (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2017), at 749.
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that candidates can spend on election advertising during the election period. There
are also limits that apply to donors and third parties.
The Municipal Elections Act, 1996, as modiﬁed by Bill 5 and its accompanying
regulations, contains several rules specifying the amount of money that can be spent
by candidates or contributed to them. Crucially, there are signiﬁcant penalties for
breach. If a candidate for municipal office contravenes any provision of the
Municipal Elections Act, 1996, she is guilty of an offence.171 If convicted of an
offence, she could be ﬁned up to $25,000.172 If a judge ﬁnds that a candidate
knowingly committed an offence, the candidate can be imprisoned for a term of up
to six months.173 This means that if a municipal candidate knowingly overspends on
election advertising — that is, knowingly engages in more electoral expression than
the rules allow — she could face imprisonment if she is convicted. The possibility
of incarceration as a consequence for engaging in political speech signals that
electoral expression can be distinguished from ordinary expression. We might ask
why it is constitutionally permissible to imprison a municipal candidate for six
months for knowingly engaging in more political speech than is allowed by the
Municipal Elections Act, 1996. The answer is that electoral expression amounts to
a particular kind of expression that is heavily regulated in order to ensure the
fairness of elections. The legally mediated nature of electoral expression is what
distinguishes it from ordinary speech.
(b)

The Impact of Bill 5 on Electoral Expression

In order to explore the impact of Bill 5 on the candidates’ electoral expression and
the campaign ﬁnance rules to which they were subject, I have developed a stylized
illustration. Bill 5’s provisions, and the provisions of Reg 407/18, are elaborated in
detail in order to counter the idea that the problem lies with the underlying
Municipal Elections Act, 1996 and not with Bill 5.174 While the sums of money are
simpliﬁed for convenience, the illustration uses the actual provisions of Bill 5 and
its accompanying regulations, as detailed in the notes.
171

Municipal Elections Act, 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 32, Sch., s. 94.
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Municipal Elections Act, 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 32, Sch., s. 94.1(1).
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Ontario claims that there is “no evidentiary foundation” for the court “to address a s
2(b) challenge with respect to electoral ﬁnances”. Such a claim, argues Ontario, would require
expert evidence analyzing “detailed information on campaign fundraising and spending from
a broad range of candidates who entered the race before or after Bill 5 was enacted”. Toronto
(City) (ONCA) (Reply Factum of the Appellant Attorney General of Ontario at para. 23)
[citations omitted]. This assertion is puzzling. A court could simply read the plain words of
Bill 5 and the accompanying regulations to discover how the new rules applied to candidates
who had registered prior to Bill 5 coming into force. In Harper, for example, the Supreme
Court interpreted the campaign ﬁnance provisions in the Canada Elections Act without
recourse to an in-depth study. Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] S.C.J. No. 28,
2004 SCC 33, at paras. 53, 57 (S.C.C.).
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The illustration involves two candidates, Candidate A (“Anna”) and Candidate B
(“Bob”). Anna registered as a municipal candidate for Ward 47 on May 1, the ﬁrst
day of the election period.175 Her spending limit for electoral expression was
$1,000 for the election period.176 Anna spent $1,000 on lawn signs, which
displayed her name, a map of Ward 47, and a slogan “Anna for Ward 47”. The
nomination period ended on July 27.177
Bill 5 came into force on August 14 and the accompanying regulations, Reg 407/18,
came into effect on August 15. Ward 47 no longer existed, and Anna found herself
in Ward 25. On August 16, Anna ﬁled a Change of Ward Notiﬁcation with the City
Hall Elections Office to stay in the race, as required by Bill 5.178 As provided for
by the new regulations, Anna was given a new expense limit of $2,000 by the City
Clerk.179 The new spending limit reﬂected the fact that Ward 25 had a population
twice as big as the former Ward 47, which it replaced.180 As provided for by Bill
5, any money Anna had already spent carried over and counted against her new
$2,000 expense limit.181 Because Anna had already spent $1,000, she was left with
$1,000 for electoral expression in her new ward (Ward 25) for the remainder of the
election period. Since she could not use her lawn signs for Ward 47, she was forced
to start anew.
On the same day, August 16, Bob registered as a ﬁrst-time candidate in the same
ward (Ward 25) as Anna. As provided for by Bill 5, Bob received an expense limit
of $2,000. Bob thus had $2,000 to spend on campaign speech for the remainder of
the election period, while Anna had only $1,000 for the same time period.

Did the effects of Bill 5 restrict Anna’s electoral expression?
175
The ward numbers are ﬁctional but they are meant to capture the fact that all the
electoral districts changed in the middle of the election period.
176
In the period prior to Bill 5, the actual spending limit was calculated by a formula
based on the ward population. Municipal Elections Act, 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 32, Sch., ss.
88.20(7), 88.20(11) (providing formula for electors); General, O. Reg 101/97, s. 5 (providing
formula for expense limit).
177
City of Toronto Election Services, “Municipal Election Report” (2018), at 15, online:
<https://www.toronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/96b2-2018-Election-Report.pdf>.
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Better Local Government Act, 2018, S.O. 2018, c. 11, Sch. 3, s. 10.1(4), amending the
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2018 and 2022 Regular Elections – Special Rules, O. Reg 407/18, s. 10.
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2018 and 2022 Regular Elections – Special Rules, O. Reg 407/18, s. 11(2) (providing
new calculation for the number of electors).
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The guidelines state that “[f]iling the Change of Ward Notiﬁcation Form does not
constitute a new nomination or campaign; any money you already raised or spent carries
over”. Toronto City Hall, “Bulletin for Candidates: Changes to Municipal Election Legislation” (August 2018), at 1, online: <https://www.toronto.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/9775Bulletin-for-Candidates-August-16.pdf>.
 Candidates that carried over from before Bill 5
came into force to after Bill 5 came into force were deemed not to be newly nominated. Better
Local Government Act, 2018, S.O. 2018, c. 11, Sch. 3, s. 10.1(6), amending the Municipal
Elections Act, 1996, S.O. 1996, c. 32, Sch., s. 10.1(6).
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(c)

The Formal Approach to the Effects of Bill 5

A formal approach would ﬁnd no restriction of section 2(b). The fact that Anna
could no longer use her lawn signs after August 14 did not constitute an
infringement of her expression because the lawn signs were still in existence. As
Miller J.A. noted, there was no interference with freedom of expression because Bill
5 “did not, and could not, erase the messages that had already been communicated”.182 The candidates were still able to speak on any topic they chose. All that
happened was that the candidates’ past communications lost relevance and were no
longer useful to the candidates’ campaigns for public office.183 For this reason, their
complaint was better understood as a plea that the government not diminish the
effectiveness of their expression. Section 2(b), however, provides no guarantee that
the government will protect the effectiveness of speech; indeed, the government
may engage in its own speech, such as the issuance of health warnings on products,
which could undermine the speech of others.184
Nor would a formalist think that Anna has any legitimate constitutional complaint
about the fact that she has only $1,000 to spend in the new Ward 25 as compared
to Bob, who has double the amount of money for electoral expression. Bill 5 deemed
that the nomination period had not yet ended by changing its end date from July 27,
2018 to September 14, 2018.185 On this view, there was one long nomination period
from May 1 to September 14. Candidates within an electoral ward had the same
expense limits, regardless of when they registered during the nomination period.
From a formal perspective, both Anna and Bob have the same cumulative expense
limit — $2,000 — for the election period, and hence there is no constitutional injury.
Indeed, a formal approach would say that Bill 5 increased the amount of available
speech for each candidate. Due to the doubling of ward sizes, the expense limits, and
hence the available speech for each candidate, had likewise doubled.
(d)

The Contextual Approach to the Effects of Bill 5

By contrast, a contextual approach would place signiﬁcant weight on the nature
of electoral expression as speech which is taking place within and being constrained
by the legal and institutional framework of an election. An important caveat: while
attention to this legal and institutional context is helpful for understanding why
section 2(b) is infringed, it does not mean that the legal and institutional framework
itself is brought under section 2(b). Section 2(b) only protects electoral expression,
not the framework of the election.
182
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The contextual approach would start with the observation that the 2018 municipal
election actually consisted of two elections with different electoral districts, different
nomination periods and different campaign ﬁnance limits. By dint of Bill 5’s
legislative ﬁat, these two elections were “deemed” to be a single, continuous
election. In reality, however, a new election forcibly supplanted an active election
two-thirds of the way through the existing election period. As a result of Bill 5’s
dismantling of the ﬁrst election, and its replacement with a second election, the
electoral expression of certain candidates was infringed.
To illustrate the infringement of section 2(b), consider the function of one type of
electoral expression: the lawn sign. A lawn sign’s expressive contribution consists of
various messages, including information about the candidate, the electoral district
and the key issues that form the candidate’s platform. The lawn sign also sends a
message from the voter who exhibits it. The sign speaks continuously and passively
for the duration of the election period; the candidate and the voter displaying the
sign can take no further action and the message will continue to be expressed. If a
street displays lawn signs from several candidates, the collective electoral expression amounts to continuous, ongoing speech which forms an essential part of the
democratic discourse, allowing for reﬂection and deliberative exchanges among
voters.
If Bill 5 had not eliminated Ward 47, Anna would have been able to speak
continuously through her lawn signs for the entire election period. As a direct result
of Bill 5, the messages from those lawn signs no longer amount to electoral
expression; that is, they no longer play the function of electoral expression given the
change to the underlying institutional context within which that expression is taking
place. Electoral expression is, as a deﬁnitional matter, regulated campaign speech
that takes place within and is constrained by the legal framework of an election.
Hence, a change in the rules such that the lawn signs no longer constituted
electoral expression in the context of the election (even if they still amounted to
ordinary speech) amounts to the “control” of speech, and thus infringes section 2(b)
under the Irwin Toy standard. The infringement arises because Bill 5’s mid-election
change to the ward structure prevented certain candidates from engaging in
meaningful electoral expression in the context of the election and in light of the
electoral laws to which they were subject. The Baier standard of substantial
interference is also arguably satisﬁed: the degree of interference with the candidates’
electoral expression is so profound that their speech no longer even amounts to
electoral expression as a deﬁnitional matter.
That the effects of Bill 5 result in the control of speech, and hence a restriction
of section 2(b), is also evident when we compare Anna to Bob. The direct effect of
Bill 5 (rather than the underlying Municipal Elections Act) is that Anna has half the
electoral expression available to her as compared to Bob, even though they are both
candidates for the same seat in the new Ward 25. Bill 5’s interference is heightened
by the fact that the candidates may not engage in more electoral expression than is
allowed by the rules; indeed, a conviction for knowingly overspending on election
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advertising could result in imprisonment. From a contextual perspective, the
mid-election change to the ward structure controlled, restricted and substantially
interfered with the candidates’ electoral expression, rather than merely reducing its
effectiveness.
A formalist may object that the above analysis essentially amounts to an argument
about the effectiveness of speech, which is not protected by section 2(b). This
proposition is based on Delisle v. Canada (Deputy Attorney General), in which the
Court held that section 2(b) is not infringed if the exclusion of claimants from a
statutory platform “diminished the effectiveness of the conveyance of this message
[of solidarity]”.186 The expression at issue in Delisle — the “message of solidarity”
— referred to the activity of forming an official union under a collective bargaining
statute.187 The positive rights cases hold that, in the context of a claim for inclusion
in a statutory platform, section 2(b) does not protect the effectiveness of the
conveyance of a message.
I suggest, however, that the effectiveness of the conveyance of a message refers
speciﬁcally to the expressive activity of inclusion in a statutory platform; it does not
mean that section 2(b) never protects meaningful expression. Consider, for example,
the Supreme Court’s decision in Ontario (Public Safety and Security) v. Criminal
Lawyers’ Assn., which held that section 2(b) “may require disclosure of documents
in government hands where it is shown that, without the desired access, meaningful
public discussion and criticism on matters of public interest would be substantially
impeded”.188 Crucially, the Court used the Irwin Toy framework and explicitly
declined to rely on the positive rights Baier/Dunmore framework.189 To engage
section 2(b), a claimant must show that access to documents “is necessary to permit
meaningful debate and discussion on a matter of public interest”,190 provided,
however, that it “does not encroach on protected privileges, and is compatible with
the function of the institution concerned”.191 Section 2(b) does not guarantee access
to information; instead, it is “a derivative right which may arise where it is a
186
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necessary precondition of meaningful expression on the functioning of government”.192 If the preconditions for meaningful expression can, in certain limited
circumstances, attract section 2(b) protection, it is reasonable to infer that section
2(b) protects meaningful expression itself in certain limited circumstances.
My claim here is not that section 2(b) always protects either meaningful
expression or the preconditions necessary for it, but rather that section 2(b) can do
so in certain limited circumstances. Similar to the access to information context, I
suggest that a claimant would have to show that the government’s action “substantially impeded” meaningful electoral expression. In addition, I suggest that the
protection against government action that substantially impedes meaningful electoral expression would exist only during the election period. This qualiﬁcation
would allow the government to regulate elections, including subjecting expression
to various campaign ﬁnance rules, provided that there is no substantial mid-election
impediment to meaningful electoral expression.
(e)

Democratic Rights and Principles Under Section 2(b)

A related argument is that the effects of Bill 5 also violated certain rights and
principles announced by the Supreme Court in its section 2(b) political process
decisions. As described above in Part III.2, the Court has interpreted the freedom of
expression as protecting more than the activities of voting and campaigning. In
Harper, the Court noted that in Libman, it had “endorsed several principles
applicable to the regulation of election spending”, including the “right to equal
participation” and the “right to a free and informed vote”.193
A threshold question is whether these principles should be applied to a municipal
election. A possible objection is that these section 2(b) principles should not apply
because section 3 does not apply to municipalities.194 As discussed above in Part
III.3, however, the Court has explained that the scope of section 3 should not be used
192
Ontario (Public Safety and Security) v. Criminal Lawyers’ Assn., [2010] S.C.J. No.
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article does not address the larger question of the constitutional status of cities. At a
minimum, it is worth noting that ²Municipal Institutions² fall under provincial jurisdiction
according to section 92(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

134

THE RIGHT TO VOTE AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

to narrow the scope of section 2(b).195 In addition, the cases in which these
principles are developed concern issues outside campaign ﬁnance regulation, such
as opinion polls,196 referendums197 and blackout rules.198 This suggests that the
principles have a broader application than simply campaign ﬁnance regulation in
provincial and federal elections. Another possible objection is that these principles
are restricted for the sole use by the government to justify campaign ﬁnance limits.
However, as discussed above in Part III.2, these democratic rights apply to electoral
expression under section 2(b) as a general matter and therefore are not restricted to
such use.
The ﬁrst principle, the right to equal participation, is concerned with the “equal
dissemination of points of view”.199 In its section 2(b) cases, the Court has been
highly attuned to the differential impact of wealth on democratic discourse.
Although Bill 5 and its regulations do not on their face provide different limits for
candidates, their effects result in a situation in which one candidate (Bob) has
effectively double the available budget; i.e., double the amount of electoral
expression, as compared to another candidate (Anna), when both candidates are
competing for the same seat in the same electoral district. One reason why it is
unpersuasive to argue that the “real election period” took place between August 14
and October 22 is that Bill 5’s impact on the campaign ﬁnance rules destroyed the
level playing ﬁeld among candidates. For a contextualist, the stark difference in
available campaign expenses, and hence in available electoral expression, between
Anna and Bob infringes the right to equal participation as recognized by the Court’s
section 2(b) cases.
Libman’s second principle, the right to a free and informed vote, involves “the
right of electors to be adequately informed of all the political positions advanced by
the candidates and the various political parties”.200 In Harper, the Court declared
195
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that “the voter has a right to be ‘reasonably informed of all the possible choices’”.201
It will be difficult for Anna to adequately inform voters in the new Ward 25 of her
political positions. Not only is Anna working with half the amount of electoral
expression as Bob, but she is also confronted with the confusion of voters in the new
ward who may no longer be focusing on the issues at stake given all the upheaval.
Indeed, moving back to the actual case, Belobaba J. stated that the “evidence is that
the candidates spent more time on doorsteps addressing the confusing state of affairs
with potential voters than discussing relevant political issues”.202 The candidates’
efforts “to convey their political message about the issues in their particular ward
were severely frustrated and disrupted”.203 If the candidates are unable to convey
their campaign messages, then the voters’ right to be adequately informed about the
candidates’ political positions has been infringed.
(f) Deliberative Engagement in the Electoral Context
A related contextual approach is to focus on the campaign speech of all the
electoral participants (candidates, voters, volunteers, donors and the media, among
others) who engage in a deliberative exchange within the legal and institutional
framework of an election. This broader approach is exempliﬁed by MacPherson
J.A.’s dissenting opinion at the Ontario Court of Appeal.204 Justice MacPherson
stated that the expressive activity affected by Bill 5 was explained by the intervener,
the David Asper Centre for Constitutional Rights:
The Charter’s guarantee of freedom of expression is a key individual right that
exists within and is essential to the broader institutional framework of our
democracy. In the election context, freedom of expression is not a soliloquy. It is
not simply the right of candidates to express views and cast ballots. It expands to
encompass a framework for the full deliberative engagement of voters, incumbents,
new candidates, volunteers, donors, campaign organizers and staff, and the media,
throughout a pre-determined, stable election period. [Citations omitted.]205
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and where to run, what to say, how to raise money, and how to publicize their
views”.206 Voters learn about the candidates and the issues, and they form their
views and preferences. The news media facilitate the sharing of information about
the election, which is essential for democratic deliberation.207 These expressive
activities “unfold and intersect within a legal framework”.208 As such, the guarantee
of free expression would be “meaningless if the terms of the election, as embodied
in the legal framework, could be upended mid-stream”.209 For these reasons, Bill 5
“substantially interfered with the right of all electoral participants to freely express
themselves within the terms of the election after it had begun”,210 thus infringing
section 2(b).
4.

The Baier Framework and Positive Rights

At the Court of Appeal, Miller J.A. held that because the claimants could not
satisfy the Baier requirements, their section 2(b) claim failed.211 A possible
rejoinder is that the Baier/Dunmore criteria are satisﬁed on the facts of this case. The
advantage to this response is that it supports the proposition in Haig that while the
government is not required to provide a platform, it must abide by the Charter when
it chooses to provide one.212 The difficulty with treating this case as a successful
positive rights claim, however, is that it runs the risk of turning every election law
case into a statutory platform case. In my view, this would be enormously
cumbersome.
Another possible response is to distinguish Baier. In his dissenting judgment,
MacPherson J.A. distinguished Baier on three grounds. Whereas Baier concerned
the exclusion of a class of people from an election, the present case involved the
“mid-stream destruction” and replacement of that platform. Second, the applicants
in Baier asserted a positive entitlement whereas the City made a claim for
non-interference in an ongoing election. Finally, Baier did not involve changes to an
active election.213
An alternative argument, I suggest, is that Baier is inapplicable because the
“expression” at issue in the section 2(b) positive rights cases involves the expressive
activity of participating in a speciﬁc statutory platform. In Baier, for instance, the
expression at issue was the expressive activity of standing for election for the office
206
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of school trustee.214 In Delisle, the expression at issue was the “message of
solidarity” expressed by the activity of forming an official union under a collective
bargaining statute.215 In Haig216 and Siemens v. Manitoba (Attorney General),217 the
expression at issue was the activity of voting in a referendum and a plebiscite,
respectively. Given the nature of the expression at issue in these cases, the claimants
demanded inclusion in a statutory regime or platform, which transformed their claim
into a positive rights claim under section 2(b). By contrast, the expression at issue
in this case is not the candidates’ expressive activity of standing for office; instead,
the relevant expression is their actual campaign speech. Anna does not need
inclusion in a statutory platform to speak through her lawn signs. All she has to do
is purchase the signs with her campaign funds and ask her supporters to display
them.
It is also relevant that the Supreme Court appears to have limited the application
of the Baier/Dunmore framework in two cases decided after Baier. In Criminal
Lawyers’ Assn., the section 2(b) access to information decision discussed above, the
Court noted that some of the parties had relied on Baier/Dunmore and that the lower
courts were divided on the application of Dunmore.218 The Court stated that “[i]n
our view, nothing would be gained by furthering this debate”.219 Rather than
applying Baier/Dunmore, the Court went on to use the Irwin Toy framework.
Without delving into the Court’s recent case law on section 2(d),220 it is also
worth noting that in another post-Baier case, Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser,
the Court explained that it had consistently rejected the distinction between negative
214
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freedoms and positive rights.221 For the Court, the purposive approach to Charter
interpretation is what ultimately matters: “A purposive protection of freedom of
association may require the state to act positively to protect the ability of individuals
to engage in fundamentally important collective activities, just as a purposive
interpretation of freedom of expression may require the state to disclose documents
to permit meaningful discussion.”222 As discussed above in Part III.2, the Court’s
interpretation of section 2(b) in the political process context resulted in the
identiﬁcation of two key principles — the right of equal participation and the right
to a free and informed vote — both of which shed useful light on Bill 5’s
infringement of section 2(b).
5.

The Formal Approach vs. the Contextual Approach

The formal approach, which ﬁnds no infringement of section 2(b) on account of
Bill 5, is intuitive and possesses an immediate logic. Despite the strength of the
formal approach, I suggest that the contextual approach is, on balance, ultimately
more persuasive. In its political process cases, the Court has already adopted a
contextual approach in its purposive analysis of sections 2(b) and 3. These cases
have not only recognized a number of democratic rights but have also described
these rights with a nuanced attention to the institutional context within which these
rights are exercised. A contextual approach to electoral expression and its infringement at issue in Toronto (City) is consistent with the Court’s existing purposive and
contextual approach to sections 2(b) and 3.
Another consideration is that, unlike certain Charter rights such as section 7 and
section 15, the Supreme Court has consistently taken a capacious approach to the
scope of section 2(b) and the ﬁnding of infringement, such that the analysis in
section 2(b) cases usually takes place at the justiﬁcation stage under section 1. An
additional consideration is that the unwritten constitutional principles of democracy
and the rule of law223 reinforce the conclusion that mid-election changes to electoral
rules are inconsistent with the underlying values of the Constitution. While
unwritten constitutional principles have been used to invalidate governmental
action,224 neither the democracy principle nor the rule of law principle should, in my
view, be used to invalidate the legislation at issue in this case.
A ﬁnal consideration lies outside the four corners of section 2(b). In recent years,
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nations around the globe have fallen prey to democratic decline. This erosion of
democracy has been brought about, in part, by executive-driven, legislatively
endorsed alterations to electoral structures, which while technically “legal”, have
subverted the norms and spirit of constitutional democracy, not to mention its
accountability and representativeness.225 This dismantling of electoral and constitutional protections is usually defended on the grounds that such changes are
necessary to improve efficiency and reduce corruption. The only defence against
such democracy-undermining laws is a contextual approach that provides a greater
range of interpretive options than a purely formal approach.
Under the contextual approach, section 2(b) has been infringed, at which point the
analysis would turn to section 1. According to Belobaba J., the province failed to
show that its objectives — improved efficiency and voter parity — were so pressing
and substantial that the ward structure had to be altered in the middle of the
election.226 The court also found that the province could not establish minimal
impairment because it had not shown why a less intrusive measure, such as
restructuring the wards after the election, was not chosen.227 Justice MacPherson,
dissenting at the Court of Appeal, agreed with Belobaba J. that there was no pressing
and substantial objective to support Bill 5.228 In my view, and in keeping with
international standards, mid-election changes to election rules should be discouraged in order to safeguard electoral fairness.229 For this reason, the burden on the
state to justify a mid-election change should be commensurately heavy.
V. CONCLUSION
As I have argued elsewhere, the Supreme Court has long played a vital role in
protecting the fairness and legitimacy of the democratic process.230 Continuing this
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function in Frank, the Court described the right to vote as a “core tenet of our
democracy”.231 Given our global era of democratic decline and rising authoritarianism, accompanied by various practices to erect barriers to the right to vote, the
Frank decision sends a clear message to legislatures that restrictions on the right to
vote will be subject to exacting scrutiny.
The Frank decision provided an opportunity to consider the Court’s political
process jurisprudence as a whole. The Court has identiﬁed multiple democratic
rights under section 3 and section 2(b), and it has also been attuned to the
institutional context within which these rights are exercised. With respect to the
relationship between the right to vote and the freedom of expression, I claim that
section 3 and section 2(b) are best understood as distinct yet complementary rights
that are animated by and reinforce the fundamental democratic values protected by
the Charter.
As for the upcoming Toronto (City) case, a central question is whether courts
ought to take a formal approach or a contextual approach to electoral expression,
and its infringement, under section 2(b). The consequences of this choice are
signiﬁcant, not only for the immediate case but also for the Court’s general approach
to its review of the electoral process.
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